«Телесное состояние (Leibzustand) животного и даже человека есть нечто существенно отличное от состояния какого-либо «тела» (Körper), например, камня. Каждое живое тело (Leib) есть также просто тело физическое (Körper), но не всякое физическое тело есть тело живое (Leib).
[…]
Чувство как себя-чувствование (Sichfühlen) как раз и есть то, как мы плотствуем (leiblich sind); плотствовать же не значит иметь плоть как некую колоду, повешенную на душу: в себя-чувствовании плоть изначально включена в нашу самость, причем так, что она проникает нас самих. Мы «имеем» плоть не так, как имеем нож, который носим в кармане; плоть — не какое-то физическое тело, которое только сопутствует нам и которое мы при этом, вполне явственно или не очень, определяем как наличное. Мы не просто «имеем» плоть, мы «плотствуем».
[…]
Во всем этом задействовано телесное состояние, оно возносит нас над нами или, напротив, позволяет человеку запутаться и закоснеть в самом себе. Нельзя сказать, что мы уже «живы» (lebendig), а потом в придачу имеем некий агрегат, именуемый плотью (Leib): напротив, мы живем (leben) именно в силу того, что плотствуем (leiben). Это плотствование есть нечто существенно отличное от простой обремененностью организмом. Почти все, что мы узнаем из естественной науки о плоти и ее плотствовании, представляет собой определения, в которых плоть сразу ошибочно низводится до уровня простого тела (Körper). При этом мы обнаруживаем много интересного, но всегда пропускаем и не улавливаем самого существенного и определяющего; предпринимая задним числом поиски «душевного» в плоти, ошибочно истолкованной как тело, мы выдаем свое непонимание истинной сути дела.»
— Мартин Хайдеггер, Ницше (Том 1)
[…]
Чувство как себя-чувствование (Sichfühlen) как раз и есть то, как мы плотствуем (leiblich sind); плотствовать же не значит иметь плоть как некую колоду, повешенную на душу: в себя-чувствовании плоть изначально включена в нашу самость, причем так, что она проникает нас самих. Мы «имеем» плоть не так, как имеем нож, который носим в кармане; плоть — не какое-то физическое тело, которое только сопутствует нам и которое мы при этом, вполне явственно или не очень, определяем как наличное. Мы не просто «имеем» плоть, мы «плотствуем».
[…]
Во всем этом задействовано телесное состояние, оно возносит нас над нами или, напротив, позволяет человеку запутаться и закоснеть в самом себе. Нельзя сказать, что мы уже «живы» (lebendig), а потом в придачу имеем некий агрегат, именуемый плотью (Leib): напротив, мы живем (leben) именно в силу того, что плотствуем (leiben). Это плотствование есть нечто существенно отличное от простой обремененностью организмом. Почти все, что мы узнаем из естественной науки о плоти и ее плотствовании, представляет собой определения, в которых плоть сразу ошибочно низводится до уровня простого тела (Körper). При этом мы обнаруживаем много интересного, но всегда пропускаем и не улавливаем самого существенного и определяющего; предпринимая задним числом поиски «душевного» в плоти, ошибочно истолкованной как тело, мы выдаем свое непонимание истинной сути дела.»
— Мартин Хайдеггер, Ницше (Том 1)
«Freud and the schools that followed him saw any apparent continuity of self and other – an experience common to the infant, ‘psychotics’ and ‘regressed patients’ alike – as a narcissistic delusion that had to be confronted. By taking the continuity of self and other seriously, Winnicott flipped this picture on its head. He thought of it, in fact, as primary.
At the most basic level of our being, Winnicott believed that separate minds give way to experiential units – that subjects with minds emerge out of the domain of interpersonal relations: the ‘social matrix of psyche’, as I like to call it. Thus, far from being separate, closed-off entities that somehow manage to figure out each other externally, we are, according to Winnicott, radically open beings in immediate contact with each other.»
— James Barnes, For Donald Winnicott, the psyche is not inside us but between us
At the most basic level of our being, Winnicott believed that separate minds give way to experiential units – that subjects with minds emerge out of the domain of interpersonal relations: the ‘social matrix of psyche’, as I like to call it. Thus, far from being separate, closed-off entities that somehow manage to figure out each other externally, we are, according to Winnicott, radically open beings in immediate contact with each other.»
— James Barnes, For Donald Winnicott, the psyche is not inside us but between us
Psyche
For Donald Winnicott, the psyche is not inside us but between us
For Donald Winnicott, your psyche isn’t just in your head – it emerges from your relationships with others and the world
«The aim of psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis.»
— J. Lear, Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being
— J. Lear, Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being
железноголовый
«The aim of psychoanalysis is psychoanalysis.» — J. Lear, Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being
(Высказывание самодостаточное, но вот, зачем-то, более подробное объяснение)
«Think of Aristotle’s famous distinction between a process [kinesis] – like building a house – and an activity [energeia] — like living in a home (Metaphysics IX.6, 1048b18–35; 1984, pp. 1656). Building a house is a process that has a beginning, middle, and an end: in this case, the process comes to an end when the house is built. Living in a home, by contrast, is an open-ended activity that can manifest a fulfilling way of life. Psychoanalysis, I want to claim is both process and activity. As a process it aims, in the first instance, to address specific problems the analysand is facing, or problems that become clearer as the analysis progresses. But ultimately psychoanalysis (as process) aims at its own activity. Psychoanalysis as activity is precisely self-consciousness appropriating and finding creative ways of living with the creations of one’s own unconscious mental activity. Psychoanalysis has been shaped and continues to be shaped so that we might address the unconscious, non-rational aspects of the psyche in humane and understanding ways. This is an ongoing aspect of a full, rich, meaningful life.»
— J. Lear, Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being
«Think of Aristotle’s famous distinction between a process [kinesis] – like building a house – and an activity [energeia] — like living in a home (Metaphysics IX.6, 1048b18–35; 1984, pp. 1656). Building a house is a process that has a beginning, middle, and an end: in this case, the process comes to an end when the house is built. Living in a home, by contrast, is an open-ended activity that can manifest a fulfilling way of life. Psychoanalysis, I want to claim is both process and activity. As a process it aims, in the first instance, to address specific problems the analysand is facing, or problems that become clearer as the analysis progresses. But ultimately psychoanalysis (as process) aims at its own activity. Psychoanalysis as activity is precisely self-consciousness appropriating and finding creative ways of living with the creations of one’s own unconscious mental activity. Psychoanalysis has been shaped and continues to be shaped so that we might address the unconscious, non-rational aspects of the psyche in humane and understanding ways. This is an ongoing aspect of a full, rich, meaningful life.»
— J. Lear, Wisdom won from illness: The psychoanalytic grasp of human being
My three decades alone, basking in the company of a mountain
«As one disappointed suitor said: ‘What are you going to do, die on this hill?’ Perhaps. If I do, it will be with full knowledge that the primary relationship in my life has not been with a person, but with a mountain.
[…]
Over the years, I’ve come to view my relationship with this mountain as a marriage, and like a marriage, sometimes I want a divorce. Self-reliance can be emotionally and physically draining. It’s always me paying the bills, replacing ageing infrastructure, chaining up the truck tyres, stocking the woodpile, and ploughing the heavy, back-breaking late-fall and early spring snows. Five years ago, I fell over inside the cabin, and as I lay on my back on the floor, literally seeing stars in the darkness, I grasped in full the vulnerability that comes with solitude. At night, the darkened windows reflect my shadowy self as I move from room to room in the silent cabin. Twenty or so years ago, I joked that my goal in life was to haunt the mountain after I die. I no longer make that joke.»
https://psyche.co/ideas/my-three-decades-alone-basking-in-the-company-of-a-mountain
«As one disappointed suitor said: ‘What are you going to do, die on this hill?’ Perhaps. If I do, it will be with full knowledge that the primary relationship in my life has not been with a person, but with a mountain.
[…]
Over the years, I’ve come to view my relationship with this mountain as a marriage, and like a marriage, sometimes I want a divorce. Self-reliance can be emotionally and physically draining. It’s always me paying the bills, replacing ageing infrastructure, chaining up the truck tyres, stocking the woodpile, and ploughing the heavy, back-breaking late-fall and early spring snows. Five years ago, I fell over inside the cabin, and as I lay on my back on the floor, literally seeing stars in the darkness, I grasped in full the vulnerability that comes with solitude. At night, the darkened windows reflect my shadowy self as I move from room to room in the silent cabin. Twenty or so years ago, I joked that my goal in life was to haunt the mountain after I die. I no longer make that joke.»
https://psyche.co/ideas/my-three-decades-alone-basking-in-the-company-of-a-mountain
Psyche
My three decades alone, basking in the company of a mountain
I live alone in a mountain cabin. Is my solitary life an indulgence, a form of madness or a route to spiritual fulfilment?
«This book is about an awareness that goes beyond the conceptual mind. As such, it speaks to practitioners of many contemplative traditions, from Zen to Sufism, from Lao Tzu to Meister Eckhart. If you think this awareness will make you a better person or improve your life, then I suggest you close this book now and throw it away.
[…]
Whether this awareness is described as an awakening or as a deep peace, it opens up a profound freedom. It changes our relationship with what we experience, and it changes our relationship with life. Yet, if we look past the elaborate metaphors, the enigmatic stories and the naïve fables, we see from the lives of teachers and masters through the ages that this knowing does not necessarily make life easier. In more than a few cases, it made life considerably harder. Buddha Shakyamuni died largely abandoned by his followers. Milarepa, the great Tibetan mountain hermit renowned for his teaching songs, was assassinated by an envious scholar. Taranatha, one of the greatest scholar-masters of the Tibetan traditions, was implicated in a political plot, his monasteries confiscated and his writings proscribed for centuries. Nevertheless, few who seek this knowing have any regrets about their decision to pursue it. The knowing is meaningful, intensely meaningful, to them on its own.»
— Ken McLeod. A Trackless Path: A commentary on the great completion (dzogchen) teaching o Jigmé Lingpa's Revelations of Ever-present Good
[…]
Whether this awareness is described as an awakening or as a deep peace, it opens up a profound freedom. It changes our relationship with what we experience, and it changes our relationship with life. Yet, if we look past the elaborate metaphors, the enigmatic stories and the naïve fables, we see from the lives of teachers and masters through the ages that this knowing does not necessarily make life easier. In more than a few cases, it made life considerably harder. Buddha Shakyamuni died largely abandoned by his followers. Milarepa, the great Tibetan mountain hermit renowned for his teaching songs, was assassinated by an envious scholar. Taranatha, one of the greatest scholar-masters of the Tibetan traditions, was implicated in a political plot, his monasteries confiscated and his writings proscribed for centuries. Nevertheless, few who seek this knowing have any regrets about their decision to pursue it. The knowing is meaningful, intensely meaningful, to them on its own.»
— Ken McLeod. A Trackless Path: A commentary on the great completion (dzogchen) teaching o Jigmé Lingpa's Revelations of Ever-present Good
Forwarded from Exit Existence
Antoine Wiertz, Pensées et visions d'une tête coupée (Что видит голова гильотинированного в секунды после отсечения), 1853.
Антуан-Жозеф Вирц попросил врача-гипнотизера ввести его в транс, который объединит его с мыслями и чувствами казнимого преступника. Возле эшафота Вирц испытал специфический духовный опыт, результатом которого стала картина.
Антуан-Жозеф Вирц попросил врача-гипнотизера ввести его в транс, который объединит его с мыслями и чувствами казнимого преступника. Возле эшафота Вирц испытал специфический духовный опыт, результатом которого стала картина.
«To lose faith in words, to find the words broken in general rather than here and there, is an unpleasant deconversion experience. Those who have undergone this crisis in faith—Heidegger, Korzybski, Wittgenstein, Garfinkel—often attempt to leave a record of it, swallowing the irony that they can only communicate using the now-distrusted words. Wittgenstein’s is the most cogent and least brain-melting; the others, and many like them, adopt new jargons, put all kinds of unfamiliar weight on parts of speech, multiply clauses, troll typographically with brackets and scare quotes, and wrap it all in puns, jokes, and absurdities. It seems to be difficult to go through this transition and remain sane, or retain the ability to articulate things in the usual way, if there is a difference between the two.»
— https://carcinisation.com/2020/06/26/words-fail/
— https://carcinisation.com/2020/06/26/words-fail/
Carcinisation
Words Fail
Notes on semantic deconversion It’s difficult to study words, because words are hard to see. Words are tools used in communication, and when communication is working, they disappear into invisibili…
«Psychoanalytic theory is born ungainly, staggering like a baby zebra, no sooner cavorting than devoured by the beasts of clinical practice - or slaughtered by rival theories.»
— Dr. Bruce Lachter. The inner world: dangerous myth or useful metaphor?
— Dr. Bruce Lachter. The inner world: dangerous myth or useful metaphor?
«According to Winnicott, “no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality...” But Wittgenstein challenged the validity of an adjectival “inner” in psychological contexts: “…one of the most dangerous ideas is the idea that we think with, or in, our heads. The idea of a process in the head, in a completely enclosed space, makes thinking something occult.” Roy Schafer drew on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to debunk inner world reifications within psychoanalytic theory. His seminal book, “A New Language for Psychoanalysis”, published in 1976, brought together his thinking from the preceding decade. According to Schafer: “…we cannot specify in a systematically useful way what anything mental is inside of.”[…]
Once our most ubiquitous spatial metaphor – that of the inner world - has become mythologised, various territorial imperatives necessarily ensue, as we defend an inner world against intrusion, possessing an inner world as my space not yours. We cannot renounce our words, but can we renounce our adherence to some sort of inner world? Is our linguistic sophistry all too seductive? […]
Schafer’s ‘action model’ definition of mind as “something we do; it is neither something we have nor something we are or are not related to or in possession of.” According to Schafer: “It has never been helpful to systematic explanatory thinking or teaching to resort to these anthropomorphic, spatial, and mechanical metaphors [of mind]…) […]
Perhaps our thinking can never quite lose […] somatic trappings; specifically, the projection onto our mental life of our earliest orality. Just as Breuer pointed out the “irresistible” spatial metaphor accompanying our thinking, so the ego’s bodily origins pervade our idiom, in the form of chewing over, taking in, biting off. And I hope I am providing food for thought, not talking shit. It may even take guts to raise this doubt. Our intellectual nourishment requires digestion to be understood. The very pervasiveness of the gastro-intestinal metaphor suggests that whenever we propose an inner world, we are projecting these oral origins onto later experience. The inner world is the lumen of our subjectivity.[…]
According to philosopher Roderick Anscombe, Schafer failed to appreciate these in-between spaces – particularly between conscious agency and an unconscious, or relatively inaccessible, aspect of subjectivity. Anscombe identifies this short-coming as a fatal error in Schafer’s approach. Psychoanalytic experience must necessarily inhabit such uncertain terrain, as between consciousness and the unconscious, along “an unbroken scale passing through every degree of vagueness and obscurity.”
The work of psychoanalysis may be that effort required to keep ourselves and our patients aloft, figurative, against that relentless gravitational pull of the literal: the effort of keeping an inner world open, when of course we know there is no such space at all. This may only make sense when there is someone with whom to create the inter-subjectivity of expression: when we learn that our thoughts are merely rehearsals for conversation.
To open up a shared space which brings into question an inner space has been the task of this paper. As therapists, we have a position from which to transcend the metaphor of position, so inner world becomes inner life, and where, in Winnicott’s phrase: “We need to be able to think hallucinatorily.”»
— Dr. Bruce Lachter. The inner world: dangerous myth or useful metaphor?
Once our most ubiquitous spatial metaphor – that of the inner world - has become mythologised, various territorial imperatives necessarily ensue, as we defend an inner world against intrusion, possessing an inner world as my space not yours. We cannot renounce our words, but can we renounce our adherence to some sort of inner world? Is our linguistic sophistry all too seductive? […]
Schafer’s ‘action model’ definition of mind as “something we do; it is neither something we have nor something we are or are not related to or in possession of.” According to Schafer: “It has never been helpful to systematic explanatory thinking or teaching to resort to these anthropomorphic, spatial, and mechanical metaphors [of mind]…) […]
Perhaps our thinking can never quite lose […] somatic trappings; specifically, the projection onto our mental life of our earliest orality. Just as Breuer pointed out the “irresistible” spatial metaphor accompanying our thinking, so the ego’s bodily origins pervade our idiom, in the form of chewing over, taking in, biting off. And I hope I am providing food for thought, not talking shit. It may even take guts to raise this doubt. Our intellectual nourishment requires digestion to be understood. The very pervasiveness of the gastro-intestinal metaphor suggests that whenever we propose an inner world, we are projecting these oral origins onto later experience. The inner world is the lumen of our subjectivity.[…]
According to philosopher Roderick Anscombe, Schafer failed to appreciate these in-between spaces – particularly between conscious agency and an unconscious, or relatively inaccessible, aspect of subjectivity. Anscombe identifies this short-coming as a fatal error in Schafer’s approach. Psychoanalytic experience must necessarily inhabit such uncertain terrain, as between consciousness and the unconscious, along “an unbroken scale passing through every degree of vagueness and obscurity.”
The work of psychoanalysis may be that effort required to keep ourselves and our patients aloft, figurative, against that relentless gravitational pull of the literal: the effort of keeping an inner world open, when of course we know there is no such space at all. This may only make sense when there is someone with whom to create the inter-subjectivity of expression: when we learn that our thoughts are merely rehearsals for conversation.
To open up a shared space which brings into question an inner space has been the task of this paper. As therapists, we have a position from which to transcend the metaphor of position, so inner world becomes inner life, and where, in Winnicott’s phrase: “We need to be able to think hallucinatorily.”»
— Dr. Bruce Lachter. The inner world: dangerous myth or useful metaphor?
A Frenchman, an Englishman, and a German each undertook a study of the camel.
The Frenchman went to the Jardin des Plantes, spent half an hour there, questioned the guard, threw bread to the camel, poked it with the point of his umbrella, and, returning home, wrote an article for his paper full of sharp and witty observations.
The Englishman, taking his tea basket and a good deal of camping equipment, went to set up camp in the Orient, returning after a sojourn of two or three years with a fat volume, full of raw, disorganized, and inconclusive facts which, nevertheless, had real documentary value.
As for the German, filled with disdain for the Frenchman's frivolity and the Englishman's lack of general ideas, he locked himself in his room, and there he drafted a several-volume work entitled: The Idea of the Camel Derived from the Concept of the Ego.
— Le Pèlerin (September 1, 1929, p. 13)
The Frenchman went to the Jardin des Plantes, spent half an hour there, questioned the guard, threw bread to the camel, poked it with the point of his umbrella, and, returning home, wrote an article for his paper full of sharp and witty observations.
The Englishman, taking his tea basket and a good deal of camping equipment, went to set up camp in the Orient, returning after a sojourn of two or three years with a fat volume, full of raw, disorganized, and inconclusive facts which, nevertheless, had real documentary value.
As for the German, filled with disdain for the Frenchman's frivolity and the Englishman's lack of general ideas, he locked himself in his room, and there he drafted a several-volume work entitled: The Idea of the Camel Derived from the Concept of the Ego.
— Le Pèlerin (September 1, 1929, p. 13)