In NHPC LTD. VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SECRETARY, the Supreme Court has ruled that it is permissible for the legislature to remove a defect in an earlier legislation, as pointed out by a constitutional court in exercise of its powers of judicial review. The court said the defect can be removed both prospectively and retrospectively by a legislative process and previous actions can also be validated.
“However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires,” the bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan said.
The bench remarked that such instances would amount to an attempt to ‘legislatively overrule’ a Court’s judgment by a legislative fiat, and would therefore, be illegal and a colourable legislation.
“However, where a legislature merely seeks to validate the acts carried out under a previous legislation which has been struck down or rendered inoperative by a Court, by a subsequent legislation without curing the defects in such legislation, the subsequent legislation would also be ultra-vires,” the bench comprising Justices B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan said.
The bench remarked that such instances would amount to an attempt to ‘legislatively overrule’ a Court’s judgment by a legislative fiat, and would therefore, be illegal and a colourable legislation.
Rohit Chaudhary v. M/s Vipul Ltd.
Citation : 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 754
Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Section 2(1)(d)
The Supreme Court has ruled that a person buying goods either for resale or for use in large-scale profit-making activity, will not be a ‘consumer’ entitled to protection of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
While interpreting the expression ‘commercial purpose’ under the Act, SC said that if the dominant purpose of purchasing the goods or services is for a profit motive and the said fact is evident from the record, such purchaser would not fall under the ambit of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act.
In other words, if the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of goods would continue to be a ‘consumer’.
Citation : 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 754
Consumer Protection Act, 1986: Section 2(1)(d)
The Supreme Court has ruled that a person buying goods either for resale or for use in large-scale profit-making activity, will not be a ‘consumer’ entitled to protection of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
While interpreting the expression ‘commercial purpose’ under the Act, SC said that if the dominant purpose of purchasing the goods or services is for a profit motive and the said fact is evident from the record, such purchaser would not fall under the ambit of ‘consumer’, as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act.
In other words, if the commercial use is by the purchaser himself for the purpose of earning his livelihood by means of self-employment, such purchaser of goods would continue to be a ‘consumer’.
SC Judgment- 6 Sept 2923 on Cruelty.pdf
184.9 KB
SC Judgment- 6 Sept 2923 on Cruelty.pdf
UPSC LAW Optional
SC Judgment- 6 Sept 2923 on Cruelty.pdf
While allowing a petition filed by an estranged wife seeking divorce, the Supreme Court on Wednesday interpreting the meaning of cruelty, the Court said that what is cruelty for a person, may not be cruelty for another and that the meaning has to be ascertained in its context.
“It has to be applied from person to person while taking note of the attending circumstances.”, the Apex Court said.
“…an element of subjectivity has to be applied albeit, what constitutes cruelty is objective. Therefore, what is cruelty for a woman in a given case may not be cruelty for a man, and a relatively more elastic and broad approach is required when we examine a case in which a wife seeks divorce”.
“It has to be applied from person to person while taking note of the attending circumstances.”, the Apex Court said.
“…an element of subjectivity has to be applied albeit, what constitutes cruelty is objective. Therefore, what is cruelty for a woman in a given case may not be cruelty for a man, and a relatively more elastic and broad approach is required when we examine a case in which a wife seeks divorce”.
Aiming to score 300+ in your UPSC Optional? 🎯
Choose the highest scoring optional subject and get taught by Jasbir Singh Bajaj Sir, Former IAS Officer, Author of Constitutional and Administrative Law and International Law Books. 👨🏫
Join our Comprehensive UPSC Law Optional Course for 😍
- Comprehensive coverage of entire syllabus
- Quality teaching with focus on conceptual clarity
- Special Focus on Contemporary Legal Developments and Answer Writing
- Well Researched and updated Study Material
- Regular Integrated Tests
🚀 Book a Free Demo at: 🚀
+91 9958826967 📲
Choose the highest scoring optional subject and get taught by Jasbir Singh Bajaj Sir, Former IAS Officer, Author of Constitutional and Administrative Law and International Law Books. 👨🏫
Join our Comprehensive UPSC Law Optional Course for 😍
- Comprehensive coverage of entire syllabus
- Quality teaching with focus on conceptual clarity
- Special Focus on Contemporary Legal Developments and Answer Writing
- Well Researched and updated Study Material
- Regular Integrated Tests
🚀 Book a Free Demo at: 🚀
+91 9958826967 📲
Handbook issued by Supreme Court .pdf
850.7 KB
Handbook issued by Supreme Court .pdf
The Supreme Court of India issued a handbook so that the gender stereotypes which are commonly prevalent in the society can be eradicated.
Women generally are considered a weaker sex and a lot of taboo is cast on them if they are victims of any crime. For eg. The dignity of a rape victim is restored if the accused marries her. The Supreme Court disregarded this opinion.
Do check out, specially the list of alternative language to be used instead of the stereotype promoting language.
#helpful for Law Optional as well as Essay papers.
Women generally are considered a weaker sex and a lot of taboo is cast on them if they are victims of any crime. For eg. The dignity of a rape victim is restored if the accused marries her. The Supreme Court disregarded this opinion.
Do check out, specially the list of alternative language to be used instead of the stereotype promoting language.
#helpful for Law Optional as well as Essay papers.
On the crime of ‘false promise to marry’ - by Saumya Kailia, The Hindu Explainer
The story so far:
👉 If a man promises to marry a woman but never intends to, and still has ‘consensual’ sex with her, it will amount to a criminal offence under Section 69 of the proposed Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
👉 The Bill, which seeks to replace the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, identifies ‘sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage’ as an offence.
👉 At present, the offence is not carved out separately in the IPC, but courts have dealt with similar cases through other provisions within the criminal law framework.
What does Section 69 say?
👉 Section 69 creates two violations: one by deceitful means, and one by a ‘false promise to marry.’
👉 Deceitful means will include the “false promise of employment or promotion, inducement or marrying after
suppressing identity.”
👉 The false promise to marry will be attracted only when a man makes a promise to marry a woman, with the intention of breaking it, for the purpose of getting her consent and sexually exploiting her.
👉 Both offences will extract a penalty of up to ten years of imprisonment.
How has the IPC dealt with cases of ‘false promise to marry’?
👉 These cases are dealt with through a joint reading of Sections 375 and 90 of the IPC.
👉 Section 375, which defines rape, further defines consent as “an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal communication, communicates a willingness to participate in the specific sexual act.”
👉 Explanation 2 of Section 375 also lists seven types of consent which would amount to rape if violated; these include if a man has sexual intercourse with a woman “without her consent,” or consent taken through fear of death, hurt or intoxication.
👉 In 2021, the Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 375, a woman’s consent “must involve an active
and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act”.
👉 Section 90 says consent, given under “fear of injury” or “misconception of fact,” cannot be considered as consent.
👉 Cases of false promise to marry are dealt with under the latter, where a ‘misconception’ is used to assess the
validity of consent.
👉 Legal scholars have questioned the use of Section 90 to interpret consent, given that Section 375 already lays out a definition.
What is the difference between ‘false promise’ and ‘breach of promise’?
👉 The law has distinguished between a ‘false promise’ and a ‘breach of promise’ on the basis of proving if the man
intended to marry at the time of engaging in sex.
👉 Courts have previously recognised the ambiguity in determining consent and intention in such cases.
👉 The SC observed that a false promise is “given on the understanding by its maker that it will be broken,” but a breach of promise is “made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled.”
👉 Put simply, if a man can prove he intended to marry the woman before he entered into a sexual relationship, but later is unable to due to whatever reason, it is not legally punishable.
👉 The Supreme Court in 2022 held that consensual sex on a ‘genuine’ promise of marriage does not constitute rape.
👉 “The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception” the Supreme Court said.
How is intention to marry proved?
👉 Cases of ‘false promise of marriage’ look at two central issues — how consent is obtained (through deceitful means, or by misconception), and whether the man ever intended to marry the woman.
👉 The Supreme Court this year said every breach of promise is not rape, noting:
“One cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him.”
The story so far:
👉 If a man promises to marry a woman but never intends to, and still has ‘consensual’ sex with her, it will amount to a criminal offence under Section 69 of the proposed Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
👉 The Bill, which seeks to replace the Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, identifies ‘sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage’ as an offence.
👉 At present, the offence is not carved out separately in the IPC, but courts have dealt with similar cases through other provisions within the criminal law framework.
What does Section 69 say?
👉 Section 69 creates two violations: one by deceitful means, and one by a ‘false promise to marry.’
👉 Deceitful means will include the “false promise of employment or promotion, inducement or marrying after
suppressing identity.”
👉 The false promise to marry will be attracted only when a man makes a promise to marry a woman, with the intention of breaking it, for the purpose of getting her consent and sexually exploiting her.
👉 Both offences will extract a penalty of up to ten years of imprisonment.
How has the IPC dealt with cases of ‘false promise to marry’?
👉 These cases are dealt with through a joint reading of Sections 375 and 90 of the IPC.
👉 Section 375, which defines rape, further defines consent as “an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or nonverbal communication, communicates a willingness to participate in the specific sexual act.”
👉 Explanation 2 of Section 375 also lists seven types of consent which would amount to rape if violated; these include if a man has sexual intercourse with a woman “without her consent,” or consent taken through fear of death, hurt or intoxication.
👉 In 2021, the Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 375, a woman’s consent “must involve an active
and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act”.
👉 Section 90 says consent, given under “fear of injury” or “misconception of fact,” cannot be considered as consent.
👉 Cases of false promise to marry are dealt with under the latter, where a ‘misconception’ is used to assess the
validity of consent.
👉 Legal scholars have questioned the use of Section 90 to interpret consent, given that Section 375 already lays out a definition.
What is the difference between ‘false promise’ and ‘breach of promise’?
👉 The law has distinguished between a ‘false promise’ and a ‘breach of promise’ on the basis of proving if the man
intended to marry at the time of engaging in sex.
👉 Courts have previously recognised the ambiguity in determining consent and intention in such cases.
👉 The SC observed that a false promise is “given on the understanding by its maker that it will be broken,” but a breach of promise is “made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled.”
👉 Put simply, if a man can prove he intended to marry the woman before he entered into a sexual relationship, but later is unable to due to whatever reason, it is not legally punishable.
👉 The Supreme Court in 2022 held that consensual sex on a ‘genuine’ promise of marriage does not constitute rape.
👉 “The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception” the Supreme Court said.
How is intention to marry proved?
👉 Cases of ‘false promise of marriage’ look at two central issues — how consent is obtained (through deceitful means, or by misconception), and whether the man ever intended to marry the woman.
👉 The Supreme Court this year said every breach of promise is not rape, noting:
“One cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him.”
Forwarded from BE N BY IAS
Which of the following country take over the next G20 presidency?
Anonymous Quiz
10%
USA
78%
Brazil
5%
China
6%
Italy
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dr RR Kishore
Citation : 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 770
👉🏻 Once a law is declared unconstitutional on grounds of it infringing any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, it would be held to be unenforceable right from the date of enactment.
👉🏻 While holding that its 2014 judgment declaring Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 unconstitutional, will have a retrospective effect, the court said –
“It is crystal clear that once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, stillborn, unenforceable and non est in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements. Thus, the declaration made by the constitution bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy will have retrospective operation. Section 6A of the DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the date of its insertion i.e. September 11, 2003.”
Citation : 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 770
👉🏻 Once a law is declared unconstitutional on grounds of it infringing any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, it would be held to be unenforceable right from the date of enactment.
👉🏻 While holding that its 2014 judgment declaring Section 6A of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act 1946 unconstitutional, will have a retrospective effect, the court said –
“It is crystal clear that once a law is declared to be unconstitutional, being violative of Part III of the Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab initio, stillborn, unenforceable and non est in view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its interpretation by authoritative pronouncements. Thus, the declaration made by the constitution bench in the case of Subramanian Swamy will have retrospective operation. Section 6A of the DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the date of its insertion i.e. September 11, 2003.”